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On 22 January 2019, Emmanuel Macron 
and Angela Merkel signed a new treaty on 
“Franco-German cooperation and 
integration” in Aachen. Complementing 
the 1963 Elysée Treaty which symbolized 
the reconciliation between Germany and 
France in the post-war period, the Aachen 
Treaty aims to further strengthen the ties 
between the two countries in the domains 
of economy, culture, administration, 
environment, diplomacy and defence. 
Although the Treaty has been criticised for 
its lack of ambition, a closer reading of its 
text reveals some hidden gems, including 
its mutual defence clause. What does this 
new clause mean for the Franco-German 
tandem and for collective defence in 
Europe? 
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To which extent is it identical or different from 
existing EU and NATO collective defence 
commitments? And what can be reasonably 
inferred from its specific wording? 
EMBEDDED IN EXISTING 
MULTILATERAL COMMITMENTS 
The new mutual defence clause is situated in 
the second chapter of the Aachen Treaty, on 
peace, security and development, in Art. 4 §1. 
In full, it reads [author’s translation]: 
Because of the commitments binding them [France 
and Germany] under Article 5 of the North Atlantic 
Treaty of 4 April 1949 and Article 42, paragraph 7 
of the Treaty on European Union of 7 February 
1992 as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon of 13 
December 2007 amending the Treaty on European 
Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, the two States, convinced of the 
indivisible character of their security interests, make 
their objectives and policies of security and defence 
converge more and more, thereby strengthening the 
collective security systems to which they belong. In 
the event of an armed attack on their territories, 
they afford aid and assistance to each other by all 
the means at their disposal, including the use of 
armed force. The territorial scope of the second 
sentence of this paragraph is identical to that of Article 
42, paragraph 7 of the Treaty on European Union. 
A mutual defence pledge between France and 
Germany may seem quite unsurprising, or even 
redundant, in view of  their existing 
commitments under NATO and the EU. 
However, during her speech at the signing 
ceremony, the German Chancellor still took the 
trouble to underline that, on this issue of  
mutual defence, Berlin and Paris had discussed 
“each and every word at length”. 1 So, what does 
this new mutual defence clause say exactly? 
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 First and foremost among the original features 
of the mutual defence clause is the reference to 
the existing commitments that bind Germany 
and France in terms of collective defence: Art. 
5 of the Washington Treaty and Art. 42.7 of the 
Treaty on European Union. This is not 
completely unprecedented for a mutual defence 
clause. Art. 42.7 TEU, for example, recognizes 
the political importance of NATO as it explains 
that “[c]ommitments and cooperation in this 
area [collective defence] shall be consistent with 
commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation, which, for those States which are 
members of it, remains the foundation of their 
collective defence and the forum for its 
implementation”. 
What is striking in the Aachen Treaty is in fact 
the absence of this “mantra” acknowledging the 
centrality of NATO for collective defence.2  
This can be regarded as quite a significant 
diplomatic signal, especially from Berlin. One 
should not forget that in 1963 the Bundestag 
when ratifying the Elysée Treaty added a 
preamble which underlined that “collective 
defence within the framework of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization and the 
integration of the armed forces of those states 
bound together in this alliance” remained one 
of the main goals of the Federal Republic, an 
addition which felt like a betrayal to de Gaulle, 
who entertained hopes of Europe emerging as 
a third force between the US and the USSR.3   
Today, the Aachen mutual defence clause 
recalls existing EU and NATO commitments in 
order to underline that these compel Germany 
and France to move towards the same 
destination in the realm of security and defence. 
The clause speaks of a convergence in terms of 
“objectives” and in terms of “policies”, 
referring to two related but distinct issues. 
Convergence in terms of “objectives” can be 
read as a reference to the well-known problem 
of establishing a common threat perception 
within and between the EU and NATO. While 
some EU and/or NATO countries have been 
more preoccupied by Russia and the eastern 
flank of the Euro-Atlantic space, others had 
their eyes mostly on the southern flank: the 
Sahel, the Middle-East, and the fight against 
terrorism. This is linked to the second issue, 
because different objectives will lead to 
different policies: prioritising territorial defence 
(for the east) or power projection and 
expeditionary forces (for the south). At the 
same time, the two issues are not always entirely 
connected: French and German security and 
defence policies are also the products of 
different strategic cultures, in particular 
concerning the readiness to use force. They also 
face different institutional constraints, as the use 
of force by the executive is under much more 
stringent oversight by the legislature in 
Germany than in France. 
The new mutual defence clause props up this 
goal of convergence with the argument that the 
security interests of the two countries have an 
“indivisible character”. This political formula 
recalls the preamble of one of the two bilateral 
treaties signed at Lancaster House in 2010 
between France and the United Kingdom about 
cooperation on security and defence, including 
on nuclear weapons. This treaty states that 
London and Paris “[do] not see situations 
arising in which the vital interests of either Party 
could be threatened without the vital interests 
of the other also being threatened”.  The idea of 
a commonality of interest among European 
countries has in fact been a recurring theme in 
French nuclear doctrine. France has repeatedly 
asserted that an attack against another EU 
Member State could put at risk French vital 
interests, potentially entailing a nuclear 
response.5  But a nuance here is that the Aachen 
defence clause does not mention vital but only 
“security interests”, which could be interpreted 
as a persisting timidity when it comes to explicit 
references to nuclear deterrence within the 
Franco-German relationship.6 
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 and an “armed aggression”, which are strictly 
equivalent concepts from the legal point of view 
as indicated by the explicit reference made in 
both clauses to Article 51 of the UN Charter on 
the right of individual or collective self-defence. 
Indeed, the only distinction between Art. 5 
NATO and Art. 42.7 TEU on the one side, and 
the Aachen defence clause on the other, is that the 
latter does not explicitly mention the UN Charter 
(an absence with no real consequences, however).  
The wording of the Aachen mutual defence 
clause should rather attract our attention on 
another point: the binding character of its 
provisions. The Aachen clause states that 
Germany and France “afford aid and assistance 
to each other by all the means at their disposal”. 
Those are significantly more muscular terms 
than Art. 5 NATO, according to which each 
party only has to take “such action as it deems 
necessary”, which leaves a significant margin of 
discretion in terms of the assistance effectively 
provided. The terminology of the Aachen 
defence clause is much closer to Art. 42.7 TEU, 
which provides for “an obligation of aid and 
assistance by all the means in [the Member 
States’] power”. But there also is a relatively 
important difference between Art. 42.7 TEU 
and the Aachen defence clause. Although the 
EU mutual defence clause creates a powerful 
obligation of aid and assistance, a caveat is 
immediately introduced: “This shall not 
prejudice the specific character of the security 
and defence policy of certain Member States”. 
The possibility is thus created to modulate the 
aid and assistance provided, even in case of a 
successful activation of Art.42.7 TEU. The 
Aachen Treaty does not contain any such caveat.  
The Aachen treaty directly borrows language 
from NATO’s Art. 5 on another point, 
however. The Aachen and the Washington 
treaties both specify that armed force figures 
among the possible means to be used in 
response to an armed attack – something which 
is not explicitly stated, on the contrary, in the  
Finally, the clause asserts that the convergence 
between France and Germany, based on 
indivisible security interests, would contribute 
to reinforcing their existing systems of 
collective defence, i.e. the EU and NATO. This 
affirmation can be read as a way to forestall 
potential criticism. Stressing that Franco-
German convergence will buttress the 
collective defence systems to which they belong 
is a signal addressed to other EU and NATO 
partners emphasizing that, by their further 
bilateral rapprochement, Germany and France are 
not looking for a substitute to the protection 
afforded by both organizations. At the same 
time, it must be recognized that such a signal 
remains difficult to square with Merkel’s and 
Macron’s previous statements about the 
uncertainties surrounding the US commitment 
to Europe and NATO, especially under the 
Trump presidency, and on the need for 
Europeans to hedge against those uncertainties. 
A REVIVAL OF THE BRUSSELS TREATY? 
If  the first sentence of  the mutual defence 
clause analysed above is first and foremost of  a 
political nature, the second one adopts a more 
legal terminology. This second sentence is the 
real core of  the mutual defence clause. The 
words used are not without importance, of  
course: “[i]n the event of  an armed attack on 
their territories, [France and Germany] shall 
afford aid and assistance to each other by all the 
means at their disposal, including the use of  
armed force”. This appears to be a composite 
wording, drawing on the strongest elements of  
Art. 5 NATO and Art.42.7 TEU, which can also 
be interpreted as a revival of  the formulation 
of  Art.5 of  the now defunct 1954 Modified 
Brussels Treaty. 
 
First, the Aachen clause, Art. 5 NATO and Art. 
42.7 TEU share the exact same cause of 
activation. The Aachen treaty can be triggered 
in case of an “armed attack” (“agression armée” in 
French, “bewaffneter Angriff” in German). 
Likewise, Art. 5 NATO and Art. 42.7 TEU can 
be triggered respectively by an “armed attack” 
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 EU mutual assistance clause. That being said, it 
should be noted that the use of  armed force 
does remain a possibility in the framework of  
Art. 42.7 TEU. In fact, a 2017 report from the 
Bundestag underlined that nothing prevented 
the use of  British or French nuclear weapons in 
response to the activation of  the EU mutual 
assistance clause.7  The difference is that this is 
only implicitly contained in the wording: EU 
Member States have an obligation to respond 
to an armed aggression “by all the means in 
their power”, which, by deduction, includes the 
use of  force. The only clear benefit of  explicitly 
mentioning the use of  armed force is to remove 
any doubt, if  ever there had been any, about the 
potential military implications, and thus to convey 
a more vigorous message than Art. 42.7 TEU.  
The phrasing of  the Aachen mutual defence 
clause can therefore be seen as a hybrid between 
Art. 5 NATO and Art. 42.7 TEU, drawing on 
the strongest elements of  both clauses. But the 
Aachen mutual defence clause could equally be 
considered as something of  a revival, in a 
bilateral setting, of  the Modified Brussels Treaty, 
terminated in 2011. Its Art. 5 provided that: 
If  any of  the High Contracting Parties should be 
the object of  an armed attack in Europe, the other 
High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with 
the provisions of  Article 51 of  the Charter of  the 
United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the 
military and other aid and assistance in their power. 
The Aachen Treaty largely replicates the robust 
language of  the Modified Brussels Treaty as 
both treaties use clearly binding language and, 
at the same time, explicitly mention the 
possibility of  the use of  force in response to an 
armed attack. 
TERRITORIAL SCOPE AND ASYMMETRIC 
IMPLICATIONS FOR FRANCE AND 
GERMANY  
The armed attack triggering the Aachen 
defence clause has to take place on the 
territories of  either France or Germany. The 
third sentence of  the Aachen defence clause 
defines the territorial scope more precisely: 
“The territorial scope of  the second sentence 
of  this paragraph is identical to that of  Article 
42, paragraph 7 of  the Treaty on European 
Union”. What does this Delphic reference mean 
exactly? 
The negotiators of  the Aachen Treaty may have 
worried that the clause, by referring both to Art. 
5 NATO and to Art. 42.7 TEU, might induce 
uncertainty about which “territories” are 
effectively protected under the new treaty. This 
would be a legitimate concern as the territorial 
scope of  the NATO and EU clauses are indeed 
not exactly the same. 
According to Art. 6 of  the Washington Treaty, 
NATO’s mutual defence clause can be invoked 
if  an armed attack takes place on the territory 
of  an ally in Europe or in North America, but 
not beyond those areas. NATO’s clause can also 
be triggered if  the attack occurs against the 
forces of  an ally which would be operating on 
or above the North Atlantic Ocean or the 
Mediterranean Sea. Consequently, this means 
that most of  the overseas territories of  the 
European allies are not in fact covered by Art. 
5, because they are situated outside the North 
Atlantic area. The reason behind this is that, 
originally, the Washington Treaty was purposely 
designed not to include the European colonial 
holdings within its scope.  
Some territories excluded from the scope of  
NATO’s Art. 5 may however fall within the 
territorial scope of  Art. 42.7 TEU. The EU 
mutual assistance clause can be activated “[i]f  a 
Member State is the victim of  armed aggression 
on its territory”. This means any part of  the 
territory of  an EU Member State, including 
those situated outside of  the European 
continent. This nevertheless raises a delicate 
legal point about which of  the EU Member 
States’ overseas territories are effectively 
covered, a thorny issue which remains 
concealed in the sibylline formulation adopted 
by the Aachen clause. 
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In the EU treaties, a distinction is made 
between Outermost Regions (OMR), to which 
EU law applies (with some exceptions) 
although they are situated outside the European 
mainland (Art. 349 TFEU), and Overseas 
Countries and Territories (OCT), which are not 
part of EU territory (Art. 198-204 TFEU). 
Therefore, it could be argued that the EU 
mutual assistance clause covers only the portion 
of a Member State’s territory that is part of the 
EU, including OMRs but excluding OCTs. This 
is an interpretation in the broader context of the 
EU treaties, which might go somewhat against 
a literal reading of Art. 42.7 TEU itself, which 
does not give any clear indication on this issue. 
It could indeed also be argued, on the contrary, 
that it does not follow automatically from the 
fact that EU law does not apply to OCTs that 
an aggression occurring there cannot create an 
obligation of aid and assistance among EU 
Member States. 
How does this play out in the context of the 
Aachen clause? The implications are clearly 
asymmetrical for France and Germany. As the 
entirety of the territory of modern Germany is 
situated on the European mainland, whether 
the territorial scope of the Aachen clause is 
identical to that of Art. 42.7 TEU or Art. 5 
NATO does not make any difference. By 
contrast, referring to Art. 42.7 TEU rather than 
Art.5 NATO enables France to include its 
overseas territories in the scope of the Aachen 
defence clause. In terms of its OMRs, the 
Aachen clause thus certainly covers French 
Guyana as well as the Martinique, Réunion, 
Mayotte and Saint-Martin islands.  If its OCTs 
were included too, the Aachen clause would 
then also cover New Caledonia and its 
dependencies, French Polynesia, French 
Southern and Antarctic territories, Wallis and 
Futuna islands, Saint Pierre and Miquelon as 
well as Saint-Barthélemy. 9 
These precisions on the exact delimitation of 
 
These precisions on the exact delimitation of  
the territorial scope of  the Aachen clause may 
appear as irrelevant or pedantic, but one should 
keep in mind (like the negotiators of  the 
Aachen Treaty perhaps) that the possibility of  
an armed attack against those territories cannot 
be totally excluded. In fact, the repetition today 
of  the scenario of  the 1982 Falklands War 
would raise those very questions about the 
precise territorial scope of  the EU mutual 
assistance clause (until Brexit, of  course, in this 
specific example). 
CONCLUSION: A “BILATERALIZATION” 
OF COLLECTIVE DEFENCE IN EUROPE? 
There is much to be gained from reading 
between the lines of  the Aachen mutual defence 
clause. Behind its terse formulation, the new 
clause conceals a series of  subtle and sometimes 
rather consequential diplomatic moves. Indeed, 
although the Aachen clause mentions NATO 
and EU commitments in the field of  collective 
defence, it omits recognizing the former as the 
principal framework for its implementation. 
And though the Aachen clause draws on Art. 5 
NATO and Art. 42.7 TEU, it goes beyond them 
as it contains both a strongly binding 
terminology and an explicit reference to the use 
of  armed force, recalling the unequivocal 
language of  the defunct Brussels Treaty. Finally, 
although the territorial scope of  the Aachen 
clause is identical to the one of  Art. 42.7 TEU, 
this in fact confirms that Franco-German 
solidarity is valid not only within the 
geographical confines of  the European 
continent but also beyond them. In sum, the 
Aachen mutual defence clause reflects the new 
Franco-German treaty as a whole: not a ground-
breaking diplomatic act, but not a trivial one 
either, it is as an additional insurance against 
gathering storms on the international stage. 
The question nonetheless remains whether the 
adoption of  a bilateral defence clause will truly 
serve the interests not only of  Paris and Berlin 
but also those of  their broader collective  
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 defence systems, as the Aachen Treaty seems to 
suggest. True, as has often been the case in the 
history of the European project, the Franco- 
German initiative might build up momentum 
for a bottom-up process, eventually leading all 
Europeans to give more substance to 
multilateral commitments such as Art. 42.7 
TEU and European defence in general. But, at 
the same time, should one not worry that the 
Aachen Treaty might also compel other 
European capitals to look for bilateral 
reassurances for themselves? To push it even 
further, should one fear the spectre of a 
“bilateralization” of collective defence in 
Europe?10   It would be a tragic irony, indeed, 
if this were to be the ultimate historical 
significance of the Aachen Treaty and of its 
mutual defence clause.   
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